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Abstract
While the various streams of environmentalism agree in claiming that the current patterns of eco-
nomic activity are unsustainable for natural resources, they disagree in answering the following
question: who is the responsible? Two different answers have been provided: the people or the
socio-economic system. The first answer claims that people are inter-temporally greedy. Unsus-
tainable economic patterns simply reflect the little importance that current generations attribute
to the living standard of future generations. According to the second answer instead, people
would prefer a more sustainable path of the economy but some failure of the socio-economic
system prevent this outcome. We provide a test of the basic hypothesis on which these two
views diverge: the degree of people’s concern for the conditions of life of future generations.
We derive this information by estimating the relationship between people’s current subjective
well-being and their expectations about the living standard of future generations, i.e. a future
far enough to concern only future generations. According to the first view, people’s expecta-
tions about the future should have weak or null influence on people’s current well-being. On
the contrary, the second view implies that such influence should be positive and remarkable. We
use various international and national survey data to estimate a standard happiness regression
augmented with people’s expectation about the future. Results suggest that current well-being is
sharply and negatively associated to a negative expectation of the future. Where possible, we use
2SLS to account for possible endogeneity between the expectations about the future and current
well-being. We find that expecting the worst (the best) for future generations has a very large
negative (positive) impact on subjective well-being. This conclusion supports the view that cur-
rent problems of sustainability are due to some failure of the socio-economic organization and
not to the inter-temporal greed of human beings.
Keywords: Sustainability, well-being, life satisfaction, Endogenous Growth, economic growth,
discount rate, happiness, intergenerational equity, time preference.
JEL classification codes: D62, D64, D91, I31.
1
1 Introduction
Environmentalism has traditionally emphasized that current generations do not adequately pro-
tect the interests of future generations. According to this view, current generations are over-
exploiting local and global resources, threatening their sustainability and the living standards
of future generations. This situation violates all plausible criteria of equity in the intergenera-
tional allocation of resources.
All streams of environmentalism converge on these claims. Yet, they diverge in answering
the following question: who is the responsible? Two different answers have been provided:
the people or the socio-economic system.
According to the first answer, the problem lies in people’s time preference. The threats
posed by the current over-exploitation of resources to their sustainability simply reflect the
little importance attributed to the living standards of future generations by a humanity obsessed
by its own ones (Pearce et al., 1990, Bromley, 1998). In the jargon of economists this amounts
to say that people have high rates of time preference, or high discount rates, i.e. the current
value of future natural resources is excessively low. According to this approach, the root of
the problem of sustainability lies in human nature – that is in its alleged inter-temporal greed.
Hence, we label this explanation of the problem of sustainability as “naturalist”. Note that
the possibility of rooting the problem of sustainability in human nature rests entirely on the
assumption that the behaviour of the economic systems reflects the time preference of the
individuals.
On the contrary, according to the second answer – also widespread in the environmentalist
hodgedodge – the culprit to target for unsustainability is some failure of the economic, politi-
cal, social or cultural organization. People desire a more sustainable economy, but this option
is prevented by some systemic failure. This point is supported by a variety of approaches. For
example, many emphasise an informational problem: people are not adequately informed of
the relevance and urgency of policies for sustainability. According to this view, if the pub-
lic were fully aware of the actual situation, it would urge the political system to adopt such
policies. Hence, the problem of sustainability is the outcome of a failure of the cultural orga-
nization that prevents a correct information able to support proper collective actions 1.
1Some scientists or scientific institutions have been accused to produce reports that intentionally distort the
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Others emphasize that some failure of the economic organization may be responsible for
global ecological crises. For instance, climate change has been defined as “a result of the
greatest market failure the world has seen”.2 Others blame the global corporations, whose
shortsightedness and political influence built an unsustainable economy3. Some others blame
capitalism tout-court, an economic system whose engine – the pursuit of profit – does not slow
down even in the face of the damages it is providing to future generations4.
All these views share the idea that unsustainability is not rooted in the inter-temporal greed
of human beings, rather it lies in some failure of the institutions of our societies that prevents
the economic system from reflecting the time preference of individuals. Hence, we label these
views as “institutionalists”.
It is worth to remark that in presence of systemic failures a low discount rate might ex-
acerbate the threats to sustainability. This apparently paradoxical outcome is put forward by
another institutionalist approach labelled Negative Endogenous Growth (NEG) (see for exam-
ple Antoci and Bartolini, 2004, Bartolini and Bonatti, 2003, 2008).
In this kind of growth models the well-being and productive capacity of individuals depend
largely on goods that are not purchased on the market but are freely provided by the natural
environment. The growth process generates negative externalities that reduce the capacity of
the environment to provide such goods. However, markets can supply costly substitutes for the
diminishing free goods5. Thus, individuals react to the decline in their well-being or productive
capacity by increasing their use of tradable goods. In other words negative externalities force
evidence for economic interests. One of these examples is the Heartland Institute of Chicago, a conservative think
tank claiming that global warming does not have human causes, has limited dimensions and presents benefits be-
yond costs. (http://climatechangereconsidered.org/). Another example concerns the American
Enterprise Institute, an ExxonMobil-funded think tank, that offered rewards to scientists writing articles empha-
sising the shortcomings of a report from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) urging
governments to adopt policies against global warming.
2Definition given by Nicholas Stern in his 2007 lecture to the Royal Economic Society.
3According to this view, the multinational corporations are responsible of producing environmental threats
ranging from the oversized role of fossil fuel in the energy supply, to the adoption of GMOs, to the promo-
tion of consumerism (see for instance Shiva, 2013, Latouche, 2009). These positions are supported, for exam-
ple, by the antiglobalization movements who fiercely accuse the global corporate capitalism of multinationals
(Boveé and Dufour, 2005).
4See, for example, Naomi Klein 2011,http://www.thenation.com/print/article/164497/capitalism-vs
5Examples include, double glazing as a defense against noise; the use of mineral water as a substitute for tap
water; the purchase of a swimming pool as a response to the deterioration of the local swimming water. Expendi-
tures for pollution abatement or prevention, for the treatment of illnesses caused by pollution, for soil restoration,
for global warming mitigation (as investment in energy saving, green transport, and conservation agriculture), for
emergencies and reconstruction after extreme climate events, are a direct response to environmental degradation
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individuals to increasingly rely on private goods to prevent a decline in their well-being or
productive capacity. In this way individuals contribute to an increase in output. This feeds
back into negative externalities, giving rise to a further diminution in free goods to which
individuals react by increasing output, and so on. A self-reinforcing mechanism thus operates
whereby growth generates negative externalities and negative externalities generate growth. In
this context growth is the result of a substitution process in which free final (or intermediate)
goods are progressively replaced with costly goods in the consumption (or production) patterns
of individuals6.
These models predict that the very long-term well-being (i.e. the well-being across gener-
ations) tends to decline the lower is individuals’ rate of time preference of present generations.
Why a greater concern of living individuals for future generations will worsen the well-being
of the latter? In NEG models there are two relevant assets for present and future well-being:
the output accumulated and the environmental resource. But only the former can be accumu-
lated privately, given that the latter is a common. Hence individuals can defend the well-being
of their descendants against the decline in the common resource by accumulating (and leaving
them) the only asset that they are able to accumulate: the private good. In this context the dy-
namics of the economic system does not reflect the time preference of individuals. The more
they are concerned for the well-being of their descendants, the more they will accumulate. But
this greater accumulation of privately owned assets does not compensate for the lower envi-
ronmental quality that it unintentionally causes, thus producing a decline in well-being across
generations.
In this economy people’s perception of future unsustainability feeds the accumulation of
private assets. Since the environment can be accumulated only through collective action, these
models describe the behavior of individuals who distrust the capacity of collective action to
control negative externalities 7. In other words, they describe a world in which the protection
of one’s descendants can be effectively achieved only through individual actions.
6This kind of growth process can be described by the metaphor of the “air conditioner syndrome” which
refers to Tokyo. This city is very hot in summer and the temperature of the city is considerably increased by air
conditioners, in general and constant use. Indeed, they cool the interior of buildings but emit heat to the exterior.
Hence people are forced to buy air conditioners by their widespread use. This exemplifies the core of the NEG
process: the increase in output – via negative externalities – raises the demand for output
7Both classical alternatives for the control of negative externalties – governmental regulations or privatizations
– require collective action. Indeed, the definition of a private property right is the result of collective action
although the latter is implied to a lesser extent compared to a regulation.
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The NEG approach suggests that the declining trends of trust in political institutions in
western countries – and the connected loss of confidence in the ability of societies to cope
with global and local ecological crises – may boost the accumulation of private assets thus
feeding an unsustainable growth path 8. If people have low confidence in political institutions
– which means scarce confidence that it is possible to pursue shared objectives to improve the
future – they will arguably consider pursuing sustainable behaviours as useless and probably
expensive. In this scenario, people will find more convenient to adopt individual solutions to
provide their descendants with the necessary tools to face future difficulties. The aggregate
result of such private defense strategies is to increase shared future difficulties. In turn, the
decline in trust in political systems does not seem a perceptive phenomenon. Conversely,
it may mirror effectively the decline of the capacity of western political systems to lead to
decisions that reflect the interest of a vast majority of citizens9.
In conclusion, according to the NEG approach, the problem of sustainability does not arise
from intergenerational conflict, but from a failure to coordinate the actions among individu-
als belonging to the same generation. This co-ordination failure is nourished by the current
generations’ mistrust in the effectiveness of collective action.
Summarizing, beyond the variety of institutionalist approaches, they all share the idea that
unsustainability is the undesired inter-temporal outcome (from the point of view of current
generations) of some institutional failure. This failure results in a behavior of the economic
system that is more aggressive towards the future than people would really desire.
Do people consider spoiling the future as a reasonable price to pay for current well-being?
Or, in economic terms, are current threats to sustainability the outcome of an optimal inter-
generational allocation of resources (from the point of view of current generations)? The
difference between the institutionalist and the naturalist view is summarized by their answers
to such questions: negative and positive, respectively.
In this paper we provide a test of the basic hypothesis on which these two views diverge:
8The trend of confidence in political institutions is sharply declining in the US since the 60s
(Lipset and Schneider, 1983, Putnam, 2000, Bartolini et al., 2013) and it is similar in Western Europe (Sarracino,
2012) and Australia (Papadakis, 1999).
9Influential political scientists have defined the contemporary political systems as post-democracies, meaning
that the growing influence of economic elites in the political decision-making process has regressed the exercise
of political power to a pre-democratic situation, one in which this was the prerogative of closed elites (Crouch,
2004).
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the degree of people’s concern for the very long-term future. We derive information on this is-
sue estimating the relationship between individuals’ current well-being and their expectations
about a future far enough to regard only the future generations. According to the naturalist
view, one would expect the vision of the future of individuals – whatever it is - to have a weak
or null influence on their current well-being. Instead, the institutionalist view assumes that
such influence should be positive and sizable.
To estimate such relationship we use survey data from several international and national
data-bases. We proxy current well-being with subjective well-being (SWB) and the expecta-
tions of the very long-term future with specific questions on the issue. We find that expecting
the worst (the best) for future generations has a very large negative (positive) impact on sub-
jective well-being. These results support the view that current problems of sustainability are
due to some failure of the socio-economic organization and not to the inter-temporal greed of
human beings.
2 Data
To perform our test we need individual level information about subjective well-being – our
outcome variable – and people’s perceptions about future, along with a standard set of socio-
demographic control variables.
This information is available in various national and international data-sets. Among these,
the World Values Survey (WVS)10 is the largest source of information covering many devel-
oped, developing and transition countries. The WVS has been established in 1981 and is
conducted in more than 80 countries world-wide on nationally representative samples. In each
wave, between 800 and 4000 people are surveyed in each country with a total of about 250,000
observations. The WVS has been administered in 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-
2004 and 2005-2007. Our baseline analysis is performed on the WVS because, besides the
large world coverage, it also provides a reliable instrument to check for potential endogeneity.
However, useful information is present also in the American General Social Survey (GSS),
the American’s Changing Lives of 2002 (ACL), the Eurobarometer of 2009, the German Gen-
eral Social Survey (GGSS) of 2008 and the European Quality of Life of 2007 (EQL). We use
10World Values Survey 1981-2008 official aggregate v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.
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figures from these data-sets to check the robustness of our findings (see section 4.2).
2.1 Subjective Well-Being
People’s well-being is proxied by subjective well-being (subjective well-being ), a concept
developed in social psychology since the early ’50s, but increasingly adopted in social sci-
ences, including economics (Dolan et al., 2008, Powdthavee, 2010). subjective well-being is
the reported evaluation of one’s own well-being and is commonly observed through answers
to questions about people’s happiness or life satisfaction (Van Praag et al., 2003).
The wording of the happiness question in the WVS is: “Taking all things together, would
you say you are: 1 Very happy, 2 Quite happy, 3 Not very happy or 4 Not at all happy.”, whereas
the wording of the question about life satisfaction is: “All things considered, how satisfied are
you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer.”, the
card displaying a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is “dissatisfied” and 10 is “satisfied”.
For the purposes of present work, we will refer to subjective well-being as proxied by life
satisfaction. However, our conclusions are also confirmed in case happiness substitutes for life
satisfaction to proxy people’s well-being. In this case we reverted the scale of the happiness
question so that higher values are associated with stronger feelings of well-being. Results for
the happiness variable are provided in the appendix.
The reliability of subjective well-being has been intensively investigated by an interdisci-
plinary literature. Subjective well-being data is not “reality free” and it proved to reflect real
phenomena. For instance, subjective well-being is well correlated with objective measures of
well-being such as the heart rate, blood pressure, frequency of Duchenne smiles and neurolog-
ical tests of brain activity (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, van Reekum et al., 2007). More-
over, subjective measures of well-being are strongly correlated with other proxies of subjective
well-being (Schwarz and Strack, 1999, Wanous and Hudy, 2001, Schimmack et al., 2010) and
with the evaluations about the respondent’s happiness provided by friends, relatives or clinical
experts (Schneider and Schimmack, 2009, Kahneman and Krueger, 2006, Layard, 2005).
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2.2 Perception about the future
We are interested in a question that asks people’s perception about the future. In order to
capture the preference for a sustainable future such question should have two features. First, it
should consider the very long-term, i.e. a future remote enough not to regard the respondent.
Second, since environmental quality concerns general conditions of life, this question has to
regard a future affecting very large numbers of people.
The wording of the question on expectations about the future available in the WVS is:
“For each of the following pairs of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to
your own views: (A) Humanity has a bright future; (B) Humanity has a bleak future.” This
variable has been recoded to 1 if the respondent expects that humanity has a bleak future and
0 otherwise.
We include such variable in a standard happiness regression to check whether people’s ex-
pectations for the future are related to their current well-being. The naturalist view of people’s
high discount rate implies a weak or non-significant relationship between subjectivewell-being
and the perception of the future. Instead, the institutionalist approach implies that people’s ex-
pectations of the future should significantly impact people’s current well-being. In particular,
the more negative are the expectations for the future, the more negative should be the impact
on subjective well-being.
Table 1: Cross-tabulation of life satisfaction and the expectations about the future
Life satisfaction 0 Bright future 1 Bleak future Total
1 Dissatisfied 43 93 136
2 24 84 108
3 112 207 319
4 137 247 384
5 409 810 1219
6 519 639 1158
7 990 1074 2064
8 1641 1343 2984
9 1058 811 1869
10 Satisfied 978 657 1635
Total 5911 5965 11876
Table 1 informs about the distribution of life satisfaction among people having a bright and
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a bleak perception of the future. It shows that there are more people who are dissatisfied with
their life and think that humanity has a bleak future than dissatisfied people with good expecta-
tions for future. This suggests a positive correlation between life satisfaction and the variable
of interest. A similar pattern can be observed when using happiness instead of life satisfaction
(see table 7 in the appendix). Remarkably, the sample is equally distributed between the two
categories on the expectations about the future.
2.3 Control variables
Finally, we include a standard set of socio-demographic and economic control variables. In
particular, we include a variable on gender, taking the value 1 if the respondent is female, 0
otherwise.
We control for age and age squared to account for the non linear relationship between aging
and well-being11.
We include a set of dummies to control for the marital status of the respondent as well.
The dummies are: “married”, “living together as married”, “divorced”, “separated” and “wid-
owed”, whereas “single” is used as the reference category.
Regressors also include the number of children of the respondent. The variable has been
recoded in three dummies: one child, two children and three or more children. Having no child
constitutes the reference category. We likewise control whether the respondent is living with
his/her parents with a dichotomous variable.
To control for the employment status of the respondent, we included a further set of dummy
variables, namely: “retired”, “housewife”, “students” and “unemployed”, leaving “employed”
as the reference category.
We control for the education of the respondent including a categorical variable taking val-
ues on a scale from 1 to 8, 1 and 8 representing an “inadequately completed elementary ed-
ucation” and a “University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate”,
respectively.
Household income is observed through people’s self-reports. Each respondent is asked to
declare to which income interval he/she belongs. The variable is organized in 10 intervals,
11We divided age squared by 100 to indicate the minimum of the parabolic age curve.
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where 1 and 10 stand for the lowest and the highest income class, respectively.
Finally, we control for the years and the countries where the interviews were taken. The
appendix provides a table of descriptive statistics of the control variables.
2.4 Sample selection
We begin our investigation from the sample of developed countries available in the WVS, from
which we derive our main results. The reason for this choice is that such countries bear the
main responsibility for environmental threats. Indeed, current environmental global challenges
are largely the legacy of two centuries of industrial history. Hence, we begin our analysis
considering first the time preference of people living in the countries where the problem of
unsustainability originated. However, in section 4.2 we extend our analysis to developing and
transition countries.
Table 2 provides the list of countries and years in which the question on humanity’s future
was asked. Overall, our sample includes 17,493 observations collected over a period of six
years between 1994 and 1998. Only New Zealand has been surveyed twice for our question of
interest in 1998 and 2004.
Section 4.2 is devoted to some robustness checks. We first show that our conclusion holds
also for developing and transition countries separately and for all countries together. Table
13 in the appendix provides an overview of the 54 countries in the WVS for which data on
well-being and future expectations are available. Secondly, we check the robustness of our
results using all the available data-sets where questions on well-being are available along with
information on people’s perceptions about the future. This gives us the possibility to test our
relationship in a variety of contexts and using various wordings.
2.5 Instrumenting expectations about the future
In our model we assume that the expectations about the future are an explanatory factor of
subjective well-being . However, it is also plausible that people’s well-being affects the way
people perceive the future. For example, it might be the case that happier people tend to have a
more optimistic view about the future and vice versa. In other words, the two variables may be
endogenous. Possible endogeneity does not necessarily point to a positive correlation between
10
Table 2: Availability of data over time
Developed countries
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2004 Total
Australia 0 2048 0 0 0 0 2048
Taiwan 780 0 0 0 0 0 780
Finland 0 0 987 0 0 0 987
Germany 0 0 0 2026 0 0 2026
Japan 0 1054 0 0 0 0 1054
South Korea 0 0 1249 0 0 0 1249
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 1201 954 2155
Norway 0 0 1127 0 0 0 1127
Spain 0 1211 0 0 0 0 1211
Sweden 0 0 1009 0 0 0 1009
Switzerland 0 0 1212 0 0 0 1212
Great Britain 0 0 0 0 1093 0 1093
United States 0 1542 0 0 0 0 1542
Total 780 5855 5584 2026 2294 954 17493
the expected future and subjective well-being . For instance, more depressed people tend to
self-identify as losers: they may expect for themselves a bleak future, while exaggerating the
brightness of the future of the others.
To deal with this possible endogeneity we instrument the expectations about the future
with political distrust. The rationale for this choice rests on the fact that the effectiveness
of collective action is a crucial component of any possibility to pursue sustainable goals. Of
course political institutions are the main form of collective action. Thus, low confidence in
political institutions implies low confidence that it is possible to pursue shared objectives to
improve future conditions of life. If people do not trust the effectiveness of political action,
they will not consider reliable any commitment to pursue sustainable goals. In other words,
since any solution or mitigation of sustainability problems has a strong component of collective
action, if people do not trust the main institutions it is more probable that they will see the
future as bleak. Low trust in institutional actions mirrors low confidence in the possibility of
coordinating individual actions towards a desirable shared future.
Conversely, in the literature on subjective well-being we did not find any evidence that
political distrust affects well-being. Political distrust is not included in the standard regressors
of happiness and there is a lack of papers on this argument, probably reflecting the lack of
micro, cross-country and time-series correlation between subjective well-being and political
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trust.
Thus, we consider political distrust a plausible candidate to instrument the expectations
about the future because people who do not trust political institutions are more likely to foresee
a bleak future. On the other side, there is no reason to expect that political distrust might affect
well-being in other ways than through the possibility of pursuing socially coordinated actions
aimed at improving the future.
In the WVS, people were asked about their confidence in the Parliament and in the Gov-
ernment. In both cases the wording is as follows:
“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much
confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence,
(3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all?”.
Based on these two items, we create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respon-
dent answered “not very much” or “not at all” to at least one of the two questions, 0 in all other
cases.
The argument that people’s distrust in politics does not affect subjective well-being , while
it strongly influences the vision that one has about the future, finds confirmation in our evi-
dence showing that the correlation between political distrust and well-being is basically flat.
On the contrary, our instrument is strongly and significantly correlated with the expectations
about the future. This suggests that political distrust satisfies the conditions of validity, which
requires that the instrument is orthogonal to the error term. These relationships are statistically
tested in the first step of regression 2 presented below and the results are discussed in section
4 (see table 4 in section 4.1).
3 Methodological issues
To test our hypothesis we use OLS regressions. We are aware that, given the ordinal na-
ture of our dependent variable, ordered probit or logit models should be preferred. However,
the recent literature demonstrated that, when the dependent variable has a sufficient num-
ber of categories, OLS provide equivalent results and have the advantage of making com-
parisons across different models easier (Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). In particular,
Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) conclude that assumptions on ordinality or cardinality
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of the answers to a subjective well-being question are “relatively unimportant to results”12.
However, to check the consistency of our results, we replicate our estimates using ordered
probit and logit models as well. Results are provided in the appendix on page 27.
The baseline regression model is:
SWBi = α + β ·Xi + ǫi (1)
where SWB is proxied by life satisfaction and happiness, respectively; β is the vector of
parameters to be estimated; Xi represents the vector of independent variables, including the
expectations about the future, socio-demographic control variables, country and time dum-
mies; ǫi is the error term and the index i stands for individuals.
In a second step, we instrument the variable of interest in order to check for causality.
3.1 Testing for causality
The coefficients from equation 1 inform about the sign and magnitude of partial correlations
among variables, but they do not allow any causal interpretation.
To address this issue, we run a further set of regressions with instrumental variables us-
ing the two stage least squares (2SLS) model (Wooldridge, 2002). The method consists in
identifying one or more suitable instruments for each endogenous variables. If such variable
exists, it can be used in a first step to predict the endogenous variable and, in a second step, its
predicted values can be used as regressors. Our instrument is political distrust and it is used to
predict the expectations about the future in the first step regression. The predicted values are
subsequently used in the second step regression to explain subjective well-being . In this case
the 2SLS model can be written as:
bleakfuturei = π1 + π2 · political_distrust+ pi3 ·Xi + νi (2)
SWBi = α + θ ·Xi + γ · ̂bleak_futurei + ǫi (3)
12Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004)
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where SWB is proxied by life satisfaction and happiness, respectively; θ is a vector of
parameters of the control variables X including year dummies and time dummies; γ is the
coefficient of the expectations about the future; bleakfuturei is the variable of interest; ǫi is
the error term;E[ǫi|xi, political_distrusti] = 0with political_distrusti being the instrument
as defined in section 2.5.
Each regression uses robust standard errors clustered by year and country.
4 Results
Table 3 shows the estimation results for developed countries. The correlation between ex-
pecting a bleak future and life satisfaction is largely negative and highly significant. Having
the perception that the future will be bleak rather than bright goes with about 5.2% lower life
satisfaction. This is a remarkably high correlation, comparable with the coefficients of the
well-established most important correlates of well-being, as being married or being unem-
ployed. The same result is confirmed in case we use happiness as a dependent variable rather
than life satisfaction. Happiness is 4.25% lower for those who tend to see the future as bleak
compared to those who see it bright (see table 11 in the appendix).
The sign and magnitude of the coefficient on future expectations suggest that this variable
is an important component of people’s well-being. In other words, people are less satisfied
with their lives if they expect the future generations to have a bleak life. This result is robust
to the inclusion of all the standard ingredients of a happiness regression.
For what concerns the other control variables, they all have the expected signs and are
consistent with previous findings from the literature.
4.1 Test of causality
To identify the causal relationship between the two variables we adopt a two stage least square
(2SLS) model with instrumental variable. Our instrument, as defined in section 2.5, is political
distrust. The first column of tab. 4 shows the coefficients of the first step where the variable
bleak future is regressed on political distrust and a set of control variables using clustered
standard errors; the second column of tab. 4 provides the coefficients from the standard OLS
model for ease of comparison; the last column reports the coefficients from the second step of
14
Table 3: Expectations about the future and life satisfaction in developed countries
life satisfaction
bleak future −0.515∗∗∗ (−8.42)
woman 0.166∗∗ (3.64)
married 0.664∗∗∗ (5.88)








one child −0.0677 (−1.20)
two children −0.111 (−1.51)
three or more children −0.0606 (−0.86)
living with parents −0.0784 (−0.97)
age −0.0680∗∗∗ (−10.11)
age2/100 0.0756∗∗∗ (11.59)
education level 0.0296 (2.00)




t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include both year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity.
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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the 2SLS regression where life satisfaction is regressed on the predicted values of bleak future,
along with the set of control variables and using clustered standard errors.
The results of the estimated reduced form model validate the relevance condition of the
instrument (see section 3.1): political distrust is positively and significantly correlated to ex-
pectations about the future. The relevance of the instrument is further confirmed in the first
stage regression by the high value of the F-statistic13. The correlation between our instrument
and subjective well-being is basically flat, satisfying the conditions of validity, which requires
that the instrument is orthogonal to the error term.
Results from the 2SLS show that the coefficient of expectations about the future becomes
about two times bigger than in the OLS case and it remains statistically very significant. Simi-
larly, several significant coefficients of control variables in the OLS estimation turn even more
significant in the 2SLS case. Estimates suggest that a respondent who expects humanity to
have a bleak future is 12.85% less satisfied with his life than a respondent having positive
expectations.
The happiness regression shows similar results: having bad expectations about the future
reduces current well-being by about 7% (see tab. 12 in the appendix).
13The rule of thumb suggests that values larger than ten indicate a strong instrument (Gujarati, 2011).
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Table 4: Political distrust as an instrument for the expectations about the future.
Reduced form OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Bleak future Life satisfaction Life satisfaction




woman 0.0279 0.166∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(1.01) (3.64) (3.52)
married −0.0208 0.664∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(−1.41) (5.88) (6.03)
living together 0.00867 0.594∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(0.44) (4.02) (4.29)
divorced 0.0407 0.0300 0.0618
(1.57) (0.24) (0.54)
separated −0.0784 −0.643∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗
(−1.53) (−5.57) (−5.91)
widowed −0.000778 0.00102 −0.00715
(−0.03) (0.01) (−0.06)
retired 0.0514 −0.0696 −0.0320
(2.18) (−0.91) (−0.41)
housewife −0.0190 0.0188 0.00103
(−1.05) (0.28) (0.02)
student −0.0349 0.102 0.0691
(−1.51) (1.02) (0.76)
unemployed 0.0503∗ −0.741∗∗ −0.698∗∗∗
(2.89) (−3.75) (−3.90)
one child 0.0169 −0.0677 −0.0501
(0.67) (−1.20) (−0.90)
two children 0.0106 −0.111 −0.0993
(1.11) (−1.51) (−1.43)
three or more children −0.00781 −0.0606 −0.0657
(−0.39) (−0.86) (−0.92)
living with parents 0.0275 −0.0784 −0.0588
(1.08) (−0.97) (−0.74)
age −0.00144 −0.0680∗∗∗ −0.0690∗∗∗
(−0.51) (−10.11) (−11.78)
age2/100 0.000905 0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗
(0.32) (11.59) (11.44)
education level −0.0175∗∗ 0.0296 0.0154
(−4.14) (2.00) (1.31)
scale of income −0.00783∗ 0.0724∗∗ 0.0655∗∗∗
(−2.67) (4.28) (3.85)
Constant 0.491∗∗∗ 7.068∗∗∗ 7.354∗∗∗
(7.33) (30.59) (38.23)
Observations 9008 8989 8989
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.134 −
F-statistic 166.22
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include both year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.2 Robustness checks
4.2.1 Estimates using different sets of countries
How much does the selection of the countries affect the results? To what extent our results can
be extended to contexts different from the industrialized one? The WVS allows to answer this
questions as it provides information on a large number of countries, includingmany developing
and transition ones14.
Results are presented in table 5. For comparative reasons, the first two columns report the
results of the OLS and the 2SLS regressions for the sample of developed countries. Columns
3 and 4 provide the same information for transition economies, columns 5 and 6 refer to
developing countries, whereas the last two columns provide the results of regressions including
all the countries available in the WVS15.
Results concerning the relationship between expectations about the future and life satis-
faction are very consistent across samples. The F-statistics from the first-stage regressions
are large enough to confirm the relevance of the instrument and its strength. The signs of the
instrumented variables are always negative, very large and significant. Moreover, the coeffi-
cients for transition and developing countries are always larger than the ones for developed
countries. In case of the 2SLS regressions, a bleak perception of the future lowers people’s
life satisfaction by 31.65% in transition countries and 27.73% in developing ones (12.85% in
developed ones). In other words, the expectations about the future matter more for the well-
being of people in transition countries, than for people in developing and, lastly, in developed
countries. This evidence is inconsistent with the idea that concerns for environmental quality
tend to emerge in societies where basic needs are generally satisfied. In the overall sample
having bad expectations about the future lowers life satisfaction by 23.8%.
Moreover, the signs and the significance of the control variables are quite consistent across
samples and in line with previous results from the literature.
Our results are confirmed when life satisfaction is substituted by happiness as dependent
variable (see table 15 in the Appendix).
14For a complete list of countries, their sample sizes and the years of observation, please, refer to table 13 in
the Appendix.
15Results using happiness as dependent variable are available in Appendix D.
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Table 5: Estimated effect of the expectations about the future on life satisfaction considering various groups of countries.
Developed countries Transition countries Developing countries All countries
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
bleak future −0.515∗∗∗ −1.285∗∗∗ −0.908∗∗∗ −3.165∗∗∗ −0.367∗∗ −2.773∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗ −2.380∗∗∗
(−8.42) (−4.73) (−14.61) (−8.65) (−3.46) (−2.83) (−8.42) (−5.16)
woman 0.166∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ −0.00789 −0.00246 0.0344 0.0373 0.0464 0.0643
(3.64) (3.52) (−0.14) (−0.04) (0.64) (0.79) (1.34) (1.68)
married 0.664∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.185 0.174 0.483∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(5.88) (6.03) (1.74) (1.29) (5.06) (4.57) (6.44) (5.77)
living together 0.594∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ −0.0259 0.00296 0.133 0.144 0.218∗ 0.219∗∗
(4.02) (4.29) (−0.20) (0.02) (1.11) (1.20) (2.50) (2.59)
divorced 0.0300 0.0618 −0.269 −0.227 −0.114 0.0258 −0.0580 0.0243
(0.24) (0.54) (−2.05) (−1.43) (−0.65) (0.17) (−0.63) (0.26)
separated −0.643∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗ −0.576∗ −0.497∗ −0.156 −0.0711 −0.299∗ −0.278∗
(−5.57) (−5.91) (−2.92) (−2.54) (−1.06) (−0.44) (−2.59) (−2.07)
widowed 0.00102 −0.00715 −0.179 −0.169 0.0141 0.00645 −0.0184 −0.0127
(0.01) (−0.06) (−1.41) (−1.43) (0.10) (0.03) (−0.22) (−0.13)
retired −0.0696 −0.0320 −0.0176 0.0379 0.127 0.159 −0.0309 0.0362
(−0.91) (−0.41) (−0.30) (0.71) (0.97) (1.41) (−0.51) (0.66)
housewife 0.0188 0.00103 −0.194 −0.266 0.178 0.206∗ 0.0973 0.0777
(0.28) (0.02) (−1.34) (−1.92) (1.98) (2.06) (1.31) (0.89)
student 0.102 0.0691 0.108 0.0217 0.0817 0.0491 0.0789 0.0378
(1.02) (0.76) (0.78) (0.15) (0.93) (0.46) (1.17) (0.53)
unemployed −0.741∗∗ −0.698∗∗∗ −0.521∗∗ −0.480∗∗∗ −0.375∗∗ −0.366∗∗ −0.475∗∗∗ −0.446∗∗∗
(−3.75) (−3.90) (−3.63) (−3.55) (−3.21) (−2.78) (−5.67) (−5.14)
one child −0.0677 −0.0501 −0.0575 −0.0336 −0.0673 −0.102 −0.0942 −0.0938
(−1.20) (−0.90) (−0.69) (−0.33) (−0.74) (−0.93) (−1.66) (−1.39)
two children −0.111 −0.0993 −0.0189 0.0451 −0.0614 −0.0469 −0.0926 −0.0666
(−1.51) (−1.43) (−0.21) (0.39) (−0.75) (−0.43) (−1.46) (−0.90)
three or more children −0.0606 −0.0657 0.0374 0.0851 −0.0269 −0.0489 −0.00167 −0.00823
(−0.86) (−0.92) (0.37) (0.68) (−0.25) (−0.35) (−0.02) (−0.10)
living with parents −0.0784 −0.0588 −0.0433 −0.0145 0.0357 −0.000802 0.0302 0.0224
(−0.97) (−0.74) (−0.49) (−0.15) (0.52) (−0.01) (0.61) (0.43)
age −0.0680∗∗∗ −0.0690∗∗∗ −0.0960∗∗∗ −0.0908∗∗∗ −0.0495∗∗∗ −0.0505∗∗∗ −0.0733∗∗∗ −0.0738∗∗∗
(−10.11) (−11.78) (−10.60) (−11.45) (−4.85) (−4.89) (−10.99) (−10.55)
age2/100 0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0565∗∗∗ 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗
(11.59) (11.44) (8.53) (10.25) (4.43) (4.44) (10.75) (10.09)
education level 0.0296 0.0154 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.0404 0.0729∗∗ 0.0511∗∗ 0.0542∗∗
(2.00) (1.31) (4.17) (3.88) (1.36) (2.68) (2.91) (2.94)
scale of income 0.0724∗∗ 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(4.28) (3.85) (4.07) (4.38) (6.35) (5.95) (7.33) (6.69)
Constant 7.068∗∗∗ 7.354∗∗∗ 6.074∗∗∗ 6.661∗∗∗ 7.395∗∗∗ 10.15∗∗∗ 5.302∗∗∗ 7.203∗∗∗
(30.59) (38.23) (23.87) (27.98) (28.15) (10.97) (21.62) (23.37)
Observations 8989 8989 14766 14766 21046 21046 44801 44801
AdjustedR2 0.134 − 0.176 − 0.146 − 0.281 −
F-statistic 166.22 74.74 32.98 136.29
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include control variables, year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. All the regressions include robust standard errors clustered by year and country.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.2.2 Estimates using different data-sets
Besides the WVS, we found other 5 data-sets providing information about people’s expec-
tations about the future and subjective well-being along with a set of control variables. We
replicate our regressions on these other data-sets to check the robustness of our results.
The complete list of available data-sets, the exact wording of the proxies of well-being and
of expectations about the future and eventual transformations applied to these variables are
presented in table 6. As illustrated in columns 2 and 3, these data-sets provide a rich set of
alternative wordings against which to test the robustness of our findings.
Table 6: Description of the data-sets and of the proxies of well-being and expectations about
the future available for present study.




Satisfaction with your life: “All things considered, how
satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 1
Dissatisfied . . . 10 Satisfied.” Feeling of happiness: “All
things together, would you say you are: 1 Very happy, 2 Quite
happy, 3 Not very happy, Not at all happy.”
Humanity has a bright or bleak future: “For each of the
following pairs of statements, please tell me which one
comes closest to your own views. A Humanity has a bright
future; B Humanity has a bleak future. 1 Bright future, 2
Bleak future, 3 Both, 4 Neither, 5 Other.”
Recoded so that 0 is “Bright Future”
and 1 is “Bleak Future”.
General Social
Survey (GSS)
Happiness: “Taken all together, how would you say things
are these days-would you say that you are 1 very happy, 2
pretty happy, or 3 not too happy?”
No children with this future, agree or disagree: “It’s hardly
fair to bring children into the world with the way things look
for the future. 1 Agree, 2 Disagree, 8 Don’t know.”




(ACL) - Wave 4
(2002)
Life Satisfaction: “Now please think about your life as a
whole. How satisfied are you with it - are you 1 completely
satisfied, 2 very satisfied, 3 somewhat satisfied, 4 not very
satisfied or 5 not at all satisfied.”
Hopeless Future: “The future seems hopeless to me and I
can’t believe that things are changing for the better. 1 Agree
strongly, 2 Agree Somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4
Disagree strongly.”





Life Satisfaction: “On the whole, are you 1 very satisfied, 2
fairly satisfied, 3 not very satisfied or 4 not at all satisfied
with your life?”
Life for next generation: “Generally speaking, do you think
that the life of those who are children today will be 1 easier, 2
more difficult or 3 neither easier nor more difficult of those
from your own generation?”
Recoded so that 2 is “Neither easier
not more difficult” and 3 is “more





Life Satisfaction: “Considering your life today, what would
you say, on the whole, how happy or unhappy are you? 1 very
happy, 2 pretty happy, 3 not really happy, 4 not happy at all, 8
I can’t say.”
No children with this future, agree or disagree: “Given the
future, one can hardly take responsibility to bring children
into the world. 1 I agree, 2 I disagree, 8 I don’t know.”
Recoded so that 0 is “I disagree”




Life Satisfaction: “All things considered, how satisfied would
you say you are with your life these days? Please use a scale
from 1 to 10 where 1 means ’very dissatisfied’ and 10 means
’very satisfied’.” Happiness: “Taking all things together on a
scale of 1 to 10, how happy would you say you are? Here 1
means you are very unhappy and 10 means you are very
happy.”
Optimism about future: “I am optimistic about the future.
Please tell me whether you 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3
neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree or 5 strongly disagree.”
Not recoded.
Results are presented in tables from 16 to 24 in Appendix E. For each data-set we run three
different models: the first one, where the proxy of well-being is regressed only on the expec-
tations about the future; the second one, includes year or, in case of cross-national surveys,
country control variables; the third one includes also a set of control variables that are stan-
dard in happiness regressions. We adopted ordered probit models with robust standard errors
reporting marginal effects. In case of the European Quality of Life survey we run an OLS with
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robust standard errors as the dependent variable ranges on a 1 to 10 points scale.
Results are very consistent with the pattern already identified in the WVS. Data from the
American GSS collected between 1973 and 1994 confirm that agreeing that it is hardly fair to
bring children into the world with the way things look for the future, correlates with -9.34% in
people’s happiness.
Similarly, the fourth wave of the American’s Changing Lives survey administered in 2002
informs that those who strongly believe that the future is hopeless and that things are not chang-
ing for the better, report on average a 10.6% lower life satisfaction than those who strongly
disagree. Remarkably, this coefficient is very similar to the one of people who somewhat be-
lieve that the future is hopeless, while those who somewhat disagree report a milder decrease
in well-being of about 6%.
In 2009 the respondents from 33 European countries were asked by Eurobarometer whether
they expected the younger generations to have an easier or more difficult life than the one of
current generations. In this case the figures from Eurobarometer show that those with worst
expectations report on average a 7.33% lower life satisfaction, that is to say a coefficient two
times larger than the one relative to neutral expectations.
The German General Social Survey in 2008 asked to its respondents whether they agreed
or disagreed with the idea that, given the future, one can hardly take responsibility to bring
children into the world. Estimates document that those more worried for the future tend to
report a 9.25% lower life satisfaction than the others.
Finally, in 2007 the European Quality of Life survey asked about people’s optimism for the
future in 31 European countries16. Life satisfaction and happiness are available, both ranging
on a 1 to 10 points scale.
Estimates are in line with previous results and consistent between life satisfaction and
happiness. Strongly disagreeing with an optimistic view about the future goes with a 27%
lower life satisfaction and a 21% lower happiness than those in the reference group (strongly
agreeing). Similarly to the results from the American’s Changing Lives survey, the more
16The list of countries includes: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Norway, Croatia and
Macedonia.
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people tend to agree with an optimistic view about the future, the lower is the relationship with
people’s well-being.
Summarizing, a set of regressions using different data from various countries, different
years and with different wordings provide a substantially consistent picture confirming the
results from the WVS. The expectations about the future are strongly associated to people’s
current well-being, in particular pessimistic (optimistic) expectations significantly lower (in-
crease) people’s well-being.
5 Concluding remarks
While the various streams of environmentalism agree in claiming that the current patterns
of economic activity are unsustainable for natural resources, they disagree in answering the
following question: who is the responsible for this situation? Two different answers have been
provided: the people or the socio-economic system.
According to the first answer, the problem lies in people’s time preference. The threats
posed by the current over-exploitation of resources to their sustainability simply reflect the
little importance attributed to the standards of life of future generations by a humanity obsessed
by its own ones. According to this view, the problem lies in human nature, that is in its alleged
inter-temporal greed. For this reason we label this answer naturalist.
According to the second answer instead, the culprit to target is some feature of the socio-
economic system. People would prefer a more sustainable economy but this option is pre-
vented by some systemic failure. This point is supported by a variety of approaches that share
the idea that unsustainability is not rooted in the time preference of human beings, rather in
some failure of the institutions of our societies. This is the reason why we label this views as
institutionalist.
Summarizing, the contrast between the two approaches lies in the capacity of the economic
system to reflect the time preference of individuals. In the naturalist view the behavior of
the economy mirrors current generations’ availability to sacrifice future well-being for the
sake of their own one. Conversely, according to the naturalist view the problem lies in some
failure of the socio-economic organization that drives the economy to produce more threats for
future generations than those considered by people as a reasonable price to be paid for current
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economic prosperity.
In this paper we provide a test of the basic hypothesis on which these two views diverge: the
degree of people concerns for the very long-term future. We derive information on this issue
by estimating the relationship between individuals’ current well-being and their expectation
about a future far enough to regard only future generations. According to the first view, one
would expect the vision of the future of individuals – whatever it is – to have a weak or null
influence on their current well-being. Instead, the second view assumes that such influence
should be positive and sizable.
To estimate such relationship we use survey data from several international and national
data-bases. We proxy current well-being with subjective well-being (SWB) and the expecta-
tions of the very long-term future with specific questions on the issue. We run SWB regres-
sions where the standard controls are augmented with the perception of the future. We find
that the importance of the latter is comparable to the well-known most important correlates
of SWB, as being married or unemployed. In other words current well-being is sharply and
negatively (positively) associated to a negative (positive) expectation of the future. This result
holds for developed countries as well as for all the countries available in our data-sets. To ac-
count for possible endogeneity, we adopt – where possible – a 2SLS method to instrument the
expectations about the future. Our instrument is political distrust. We find that expecting the
worst (the best) for future generations has a very large negative (positive) impact on subjective
well-being.
These results suggest that current problems of sustainability are due to some failure of the
socio-economic organization and not to the inter-temporal greed of human beings.
5.1 Policy implications
The institutionalist and the naturalist views have different implications for the design of environmentally-
friendly policies. Indeed, it is very different if such policies are aimed at leading the economy
to correct (naturalist view) or to respect (institutionalist view) the time preference of individu-
als.
A relevant instance concerns the “third option” for the management of local commons
emerged in the past few decades, beyond the traditional alternatives of governmental regu-
lations and privatization: the empowerment of local communities. A wide range of current
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and past experiences analyzed in the past 25 years “challenged the conventional wisdom by
demonstrating how local property can be successfully managed by local commons without
any regulation by central authorities or privatization”.17. Contemporary examples of effective
management of commons by local communities are not rare not only in developing countries
but also in industrialized ones 18.
A pessimistic view of the discount rate tends to consider with pessimism the effectiveness
of this third option and more in general of all bottom-up approaches to policies for sustain-
ability. Other examples of this kind of approaches concern education to sustainability and
the development of eco-labelling to allow consumers to choose sustainably produced goods.
Eco-labelling for instance, is based on the idea that people are willing to pay a higher price
for a good that they know to be produced sustainably. Of course, such willingness can only be
based on a widespread preference for sustainability.
If the problem is to contrast people’s time preferences, to empower people in any form –
communitarian included – can hardly be seen as the solution. It is difficult to think that policies
aimed at correcting preferences can gain wide consensus, support and participation. These
policies imply some doses of coercion because their goal is to bring the economic system not
to respect the preferences of individuals. The flavour of this coercion is hardly consistent with
any bottom-up approach to collective action for sustainability 19.
Instead, if the goal of policies is to lead the economy to respect the time preference of
individuals one can see bottom-up approaches to policies in a more favourable light. In this
view, empowering people can solve some of the coordination failures that lead the economy
not to respect the discount rate of individuals.
17 The citation is drawn from the official motivation of the Nobel prize awarded to Elinor Ostrom. Her work
(for instance Ostrom, 2000, 1990) is a prominent example of a wide range of anthropological and historical
studies documenting literally hundreds of cases in which the regulation mechanisms that have guaranteed for
centuries, if not millennia, the sustainability of commons in various parts of the world are not explicable without
the extensive use of cooperative mechanisms based on pro-social motives (Bowles and Gintis, 2011)
18One may think for instance of the growing experience of urban gardens or to the European experience of
recycling of urban waste, in which the most successful shares of recycling (around 85%) have been obtained
through the involvement of local communities.
19The issue of the possible doses of coercion implied by policies for sustainability has always been present
in the environmental debate since its early development. See for example the contrast that opposed two early
ecologists, Ehrlich and Commoner, in the ’70s. Commoner accused the policies proposed by Ehrlich for slowing
population growth of being politically totalitarian and coercive (Ehrlich and Club, 1971, Holden, 1972)
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A Descriptive Statistics of the sample of Developed countries from the
WVS.
Table 7: Cross-tabulation of happiness and the expectations about the future
0 Bright future 1 Bleak future Total
1 not at all happy 40 108 148
2 not very happy 297 698 995
3 quite happy 3906 3989 7895
4 very happy 2484 1570 4054
Total 6727 6365 13092
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of control variables
Variable Mean Sd Min Max Obs.
Female 0.519 0.500 0 1 17463
Married 0.584 0.493 0 1 17405
Living together as married 0.076 0.265 0 1 17405
Divorced 0.053 0.224 0 1 17405
Separated 0.019 0.137 0 1 17405
Widowed 0.063 0.243 0 1 17405
Retired 0.170 0.376 0 1 16404
Housewife 0.115 0.319 0 1 16404
Student 0.057 0.231 0 1 16404
Unemployed 0.056 0.230 0 1 16404
One child 0.141 0.348 0 1 17330
Two children 0.286 0.452 0 1 17330
Three or more children 0.267 0.442 0 1 17330
Living with parents 0.140 0.347 0 1 15000
Age 44.384 16.870 15 95 17407
Age2/100 22.545 16.421 2.25 90.25 17407
Education level 4.751 2.266 1 8 16114
Income scale 5.489 2.737 1 10 15180
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B Regressions with various estimation methods on the sample of Devel-
oped countries.
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Table 9: Estimates using ordered probit, ordered logit and OLS models on WVS data using
life satisfaction as a dependent variable.
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit OLS
bleak future −0.283∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗ −0.515∗∗∗
(−8.44) (−7.48) (−8.42)
woman 0.108∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(3.85) (3.90) (3.64)
married 0.376∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(5.93) (5.63) (5.88)
living together 0.346∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗
(4.27) (4.48) (4.02)
divorced 0.0111 0.0178 0.0300
(0.16) (0.15) (0.24)
separated −0.311∗∗∗ −0.629∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗
(−4.93) (−6.07) (−5.57)
widowed 0.000789 −0.0349 0.00102
(0.01) (−0.27) (0.01)
retired −0.0183 −0.0444 −0.0696
(−0.42) (−0.50) (−0.91)
housewife 0.0141 0.0513 0.0188
(0.38) (0.93) (0.28)
student 0.0696 0.114 0.102
(1.17) (1.09) (1.02)
unemployed −0.375∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.741∗∗
(−3.72) (−3.73) (−3.75)
one child −0.0308 −0.0673 −0.0677
(−0.97) (−1.10) (−1.20)
two children −0.0666 −0.112 −0.111
(−1.65) (−1.68) (−1.51)
three or more children −0.0316 −0.0570 −0.0606
(−0.82) (−0.86) (−0.86)
living with parents −0.0352 −0.0452 −0.0784
(−0.79) (−0.57) (−0.97)
age −0.0374∗∗∗ −0.0675∗∗∗ −0.0680∗∗∗
(−7.58) (−7.30) (−10.11)
age2/100 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.0756∗∗∗
(8.32) (7.88) (11.59)
education level 0.0117 0.0262 0.0296
(1.27) (1.57) (2.00)
scale of income 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0724∗∗
(3.99) (3.60) (4.28)
Observations 8989 8989 8989
Adjusted R2 0.134
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.038
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include both year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Estimates using ordered probit, ordered logit and OLS models on WVS data using
happiness as a dependent variable.
Ordered Probit Ordered Logit OLS
bleak future −0.343∗∗∗ −0.574∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(−10.37) (−9.57) (−8.49)
woman 0.147∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.0711∗∗
(3.78) (3.74) (3.62)
married 0.594∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(13.43) (13.02) (16.60)
living together 0.477∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(10.42) (10.75) (10.08)
divorced 0.0397 0.0920 0.00862
(0.70) (0.92) (0.29)
separated −0.115 −0.235 −0.0697
(−1.87) (−1.90) (−1.94)
widowed −0.0219 −0.0738 −0.0312
(−0.24) (−0.36) (−0.60)
retired −0.0369 −0.0685 −0.0228
(−0.55) (−0.56) (−0.64)
housewife −0.0296 −0.0245 −0.0173
(−0.56) (−0.27) (−0.68)
student 0.0730 0.142 0.0347
(0.84) (0.90) (0.83)
unemployed −0.273∗ −0.500∗ −0.152
(−2.30) (−2.17) (−2.21)
one child −0.121∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.0622∗∗
(−3.64) (−3.57) (−3.92)
two children −0.0527 −0.103 −0.0256
(−1.35) (−1.50) (−1.30)
three or more children −0.0510 −0.103 −0.0232
(−0.98) (−1.02) (−0.91)
living with parents 0.0776∗ 0.135 0.0399
(1.98) (1.87) (2.07)
age −0.0341∗∗∗ −0.0584∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗∗
(−4.72) (−4.33) (−5.04)
age2/100 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗
(4.25) (4.00) (4.54)
education level 0.0115∗ 0.0173 0.00607
(2.07) (1.62) (2.23)
scale of income 0.0241∗∗ 0.0372∗ 0.0116∗
(2.64) (2.37) (2.47)
Observations 8965 8965 8965
Adjusted R2 0.138
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.079
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include both year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C Happiness Regressions
Table 11: Expectations about the future and happiness in developed countries
happiness
bleak future −0.171∗∗∗ (−8.49)
woman 0.0711∗∗ (3.62)
married 0.294∗∗∗ (16.60)








one child −0.0622∗∗ (−3.92)
two children −0.0256 (−1.30)
three or more children −0.0232 (−0.91)
living with parents 0.0399 (2.07)
age −0.0173∗∗∗ (−5.04)
age2/100 0.0160∗∗ (4.54)
education level 0.00607 (2.23)




t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include both year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: Using political distrust as an instrument for the expectations about the future. The
sample includes the Developed countries from the WVS.
Reduced form OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Bleak future Happiness Happiness




woman 0.0279 0.0711∗∗ 0.0750∗∗∗
(1.01) (3.62) (3.65)
married −0.0208 0.294∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(−1.41) (16.60) (16.05)
living together 0.00867 0.240∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.44) (10.08) (11.17)
divorced 0.0407 0.00862 0.0135
(1.57) (0.29) (0.46)
separated −0.0784 −0.0697 −0.0787∗
(−1.53) (−1.94) (−2.38)
widowed −0.000778 −0.0312 −0.0325
(−0.03) (−0.60) (−0.65)
retired 0.0514 −0.0228 −0.0169
(2.18) (−0.64) (−0.49)
housewife −0.0190 −0.0173 −0.0198
(−1.05) (−0.68) (−0.81)
student −0.0349 0.0347 0.0298
(−1.51) (0.83) (0.77)
unemployed 0.0503∗ −0.152 −0.145∗
(2.89) (−2.21) (−2.28)
one child 0.0169 −0.0622∗∗ −0.0593∗∗∗
(0.67) (−3.92) (−3.72)
two children 0.0106 −0.0256 −0.0236
(1.11) (−1.30) (−1.27)
three or more children −0.00781 −0.0232 −0.0239
(−0.39) (−0.91) (−0.97)
living with parents 0.0275 0.0399 0.0431∗
(1.08) (2.07) (2.56)
age −0.00144 −0.0173∗∗∗ −0.0174∗∗∗
(−0.51) (−5.04) (−5.66)
age2/100 0.000905 0.0160∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.32) (4.54) (4.91)
education level −0.0175∗∗ 0.00607 0.00393
(−4.14) (2.23) (1.81)
scale of income −0.00783∗ 0.0116∗ 0.0106∗
(−2.67) (2.47) (2.48)
Constant 0.491∗∗∗ 3.310∗∗∗ 3.353∗∗∗
(7.33) (43.13) (47.33)
Observations 9008 8965 8965
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.138 −
F-statistics 164.39
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include both year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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D Regression including all the countries in the WVS
32
Table 13: Availability of data across countries and over time.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2004 Total
Albania 0 0 0 0 999 0 0 999
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 2002 0 0 0 2002
Argentina 0 1079 0 0 0 0 0 1079
Australia 0 2048 0 0 0 0 0 2048
Bangladesh 0 0 1525 0 0 0 0 1525
Armenia 0 0 0 2000 0 0 0 2000
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 1200 0 0 1200
Brazil 0 0 0 1149 0 0 0 1149
Bulgaria 0 0 0 1072 0 0 0 1072
Belarus 0 0 2092 0 0 0 0 2092
Chile 0 0 1000 0 0 0 0 1000
China 0 1500 0 0 0 0 0 1500
Taiwan 780 0 0 0 0 0 0 780
Colombia 0 0 0 3029 2996 0 0 6025
Croatia 0 0 1196 0 0 0 0 1196
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 1147 0 0 1147
Dominican Republic 0 0 417 0 0 0 0 417
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 1254 0 1254
Estonia 0 0 1021 0 0 0 0 1021
Finland 0 0 987 0 0 0 0 987
Georgia 0 0 2008 0 0 0 0 2008
Germany 0 0 0 2026 0 0 0 2026
Hungary 0 0 0 0 650 0 0 650
India 0 2040 0 0 0 0 0 2040
Japan 0 1054 0 0 0 0 0 1054
South Korea 0 0 1249 0 0 0 0 1249
Latvia 0 0 1200 0 0 0 0 1200
Lithuania 0 0 0 1009 0 0 0 1009
Mexico 0 0 2364 0 0 0 0 2364
Moldova 0 0 984 0 0 0 0 984
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 1201 0 954 2155
Nigeria 0 1996 0 0 0 0 0 1996
Norway 0 0 1127 0 0 0 0 1127
Pakistan 0 0 0 733 0 0 0 733
Peru 0 0 1211 0 0 0 0 1211
Philippines 0 0 1200 0 0 0 0 1200
Poland 0 0 0 1153 0 0 0 1153
Puerto Rico 0 1164 0 0 0 0 0 1164
Romania 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 1239
Russian Federation 0 2040 0 0 0 0 0 2040
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 1095 0 0 1095
Slovenia 0 1007 0 0 0 0 0 1007
South Africa 0 0 2935 0 0 0 0 2935
Spain 0 1211 0 0 0 0 0 1211
Sweden 0 0 1009 0 0 0 0 1009
Switzerland 0 0 1212 0 0 0 0 1212
Turkey 0 0 1907 0 0 0 0 1907
Ukraine 0 0 2811 0 0 0 0 2811
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 995 0 0 995
Great Britain 0 0 0 0 1093 0 0 1093
United States 0 1542 0 0 0 0 0 1542
Uruguay 0 0 1000 0 0 0 0 1000
Venezuela 0 0 1200 0 0 0 0 1200
Serbia and Montenegro 0 0 1520 0 0 0 0 1520
Total 780 16681 33175 14173 12615 1254 954 79632
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Table 14: List of all countries available in the WVS ordered by level of development.




Germany Chile Bosnia and Herzegovina
Japan China Bulgaria
South Korea Colombia Belarus
New Zealand Dominican Republic Croatia




Great Britain Pakistan Latvia










Table 15: Estimated effect of the expectations about the future on happiness considering various groups of countries.
Developed countries Transition countries Developing countries All countries
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
bleak future −0.171∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.849∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.777∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗
(−8.49) (−3.64) (−17.50) (−6.32) (−5.55) (−2.23) (−11.22) (−4.17)
woman 0.0711∗∗ 0.0750∗∗∗ −0.00678 −0.00618 0.0236 0.0257 0.0226∗ 0.0276∗
(3.62) (3.65) (−0.70) (−0.54) (1.34) (1.68) (2.17) (2.40)
married 0.294∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(16.60) (16.05) (7.16) (5.97) (5.95) (5.56) (10.55) (9.88)
living together 0.240∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0561 0.0561 0.103∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(10.08) (11.17) (3.90) (4.00) (1.22) (1.42) (3.56) (3.93)
divorced 0.00862 0.0135 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.0848 −0.0516 −0.0828∗∗ −0.0617∗
(0.29) (0.46) (−4.32) (−3.50) (−1.60) (−1.11) (−2.96) (−2.24)
separated −0.0697 −0.0787∗ −0.131 −0.106 −0.0979 −0.0756 −0.0938∗∗ −0.0885∗
(−1.94) (−2.38) (−1.68) (−1.39) (−1.88) (−1.39) (−2.79) (−2.42)
widowed −0.0312 −0.0325 −0.0795∗ −0.0772∗ −0.0863 −0.0889 −0.0768∗∗ −0.0763∗∗
(−0.60) (−0.65) (−2.19) (−2.38) (−1.86) (−1.54) (−2.80) (−2.60)
retired −0.0228 −0.0169 −0.00373 0.0125 0.0466 0.0534 −0.00318 0.0140
(−0.64) (−0.49) (−0.13) (0.43) (1.05) (1.26) (−0.14) (0.63)
housewife −0.0173 −0.0198 −0.0173 −0.0364 0.0544 0.0622 0.0277 0.0236
(−0.68) (−0.81) (−0.54) (−1.08) (1.42) (1.64) (1.06) (0.84)
student 0.0347 0.0298 0.0206 −0.00202 0.0183 0.00867 0.0273 0.0166
(0.83) (0.77) (0.75) (−0.07) (1.00) (0.49) (1.91) (1.19)
unemployed −0.152 −0.145∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.0808∗ −0.0800∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(−2.21) (−2.28) (−4.16) (−4.13) (−2.73) (−2.41) (−5.12) (−4.57)
one child −0.0622∗∗ −0.0593∗∗∗ 0.00445 0.00973 −0.0461 −0.0564 −0.0403∗ −0.0405
(−3.92) (−3.72) (0.20) (0.40) (−1.33) (−1.46) (−2.14) (−1.94)
two children −0.0256 −0.0236 0.0382 0.0534∗ −0.0574 −0.0549 −0.0259 −0.0199
(−1.30) (−1.27) (1.62) (2.05) (−1.56) (−1.30) (−1.25) (−0.85)
three or more children −0.0232 −0.0239 0.0464 0.0565∗ −0.0988 −0.105∗ −0.0412 −0.0435
(−0.91) (−0.97) (1.66) (2.00) (−2.01) (−2.01) (−1.50) (−1.48)
living with parents 0.0399 0.0431∗ 0.0149 0.0238 0.0196 0.00881 0.0264 0.0242
(2.07) (2.56) (0.76) (1.05) (0.77) (0.33) (1.65) (1.43)
age −0.0173∗∗∗ −0.0174∗∗∗ −0.0244∗∗∗ −0.0228∗∗∗ −0.0132∗∗∗ −0.0136∗∗∗ −0.0177∗∗∗ −0.0179∗∗∗
(−5.04) (−5.66) (−8.09) (−7.45) (−4.36) (−4.69) (−8.32) (−8.37)
age2/100 0.0160∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0140∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗∗
(4.54) (4.91) (5.77) (5.66) (4.46) (4.79) (7.85) (7.69)
education level 0.00607 0.00393 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0148∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
(2.23) (1.81) (4.62) (4.57) (2.55) (3.89) (4.37) (4.05)
scale of income 0.0116∗ 0.0106∗ 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗
(2.47) (2.48) (4.42) (4.90) (5.19) (5.03) (6.41) (5.66)
Constant 3.310∗∗∗ 3.353∗∗∗ 2.928∗∗∗ 2.715∗∗∗ 3.397∗∗∗ 3.868∗∗∗ 3.223∗∗∗ 3.364∗∗∗
(43.13) (47.33) (51.26) (43.02) (45.01) (12.74) (58.09) (40.77)
Observations 8965 8965 14647 14647 21558 21558 45170 45170
AdjustedR2 0.138 − 0.156 − 0.089 − 0.210 −
F-statistic 164.39 72.35 31.1 131.28
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include control variables, year and country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. All the regressions include robust standard errors clustered by year and country.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5
E Estimation using different data-sets
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Table 16: General Social Survey, Ordered probit estimates for happiness
(1) (2) (3)
happy






























three or more children −0.100∗∗
(−3.10)






Inflation-adjusted family income (log) 0.151∗∗∗
(12.45)
number of persons in household −0.0135
(−1.84)
cut1
Constant −1.317∗∗∗ −1.366∗∗∗ 0.141
(−98.97) (−41.81) (1.00)
cut2
Constant 0.314∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 1.873∗∗∗
(28.52) (8.45) (13.25)
Observations 19665 19665 17972
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.014 0.054
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(1) The only regressor is the expectation about the future
(2) and (3) Regressors include year dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 37
Table 17: Dependent variable: happiness. Using confidence in the scientific community as an
instrument for the expectations about the future.
Reduced form OLS 2SLS
main
confidence in scientific community 0.200∗∗∗
(10.37)
woman 0.0307 0.0840∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(1.27) (8.98) (8.53)
married −0.0261 0.209∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(−0.61) (12.96) (9.51)
widowed 0.00646 −0.106∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗
(0.10) (−4.33) (−3.49)
divorced 0.109∗ −0.0578∗∗ −0.0320
(2.03) (−2.84) (−1.16)
separated 0.227∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.0655
(3.03) (−4.59) (−1.59)
one child 0.00394 −0.0779∗∗∗ −0.0727∗∗∗
(0.09) (−4.86) (−3.49)
two children −0.00730 −0.0422∗∗ −0.0321
(−0.18) (−2.62) (−1.54)
three or more children −0.0612 −0.0558∗∗ −0.0541∗
(−1.41) (−3.27) (−2.41)
age of respondent 0.0133∗∗ −0.00994∗∗∗ −0.00736∗∗
(2.79) (−5.35) (−2.81)
age2/100 −0.0136∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(−2.80) (7.24) (4.36)
degree −0.291∗∗∗ 0.0114∗ −0.0511∗∗∗
(−22.08) (2.49) (−3.41)
Inflation-adjusted family income (log) −0.184∗∗∗ 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.0488∗∗∗
(−11.69) (13.66) (3.84)
number of persons in household 0.00604 −0.00772∗ −0.00542
(0.64) (−1.98) (−1.09)
o.year==1985 0 −0.0386 0
(.) (−1.66) (.)
unfair to give birth to child −0.151∗∗∗ −0.744∗∗∗
(−15.03) (−5.39)
Constant 1.176∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 1.986∗∗∗
(6.64) (19.99) (11.58)
Observations 12795 17972 12724
Adjusted R2 0.093 .
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include year dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity.
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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futhop==2 −0.270∗∗∗ (−4.28) −0.322∗∗∗ (−4.90)
futhop==3 −0.437∗∗∗ (−5.08) −0.562∗∗∗ (−6.11)













9 < educ <= 11 years −0.175 (−1.25)
educ = 12 years −0.249∗ (−1.96)
13 < educ <= 15 years −0.350∗∗ (−2.69)
educ > 16 years −0.283∗ (−2.14)
Observations 1656 1654
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.043
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
Variable of interest:
The future seems hopeless to me and I can’t believe that things are changing for the better
on a scale where 1 Strongly disagree and 4 Strongly agree
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 19: Eurobarometer 72.4 (Oct-Nov 2009), Ordered probit estimates for life satisfaction.
(1) (2) (3)
life satisfaction
lifefut==2 −0.0545∗∗ (−2.79) −0.0849∗∗∗ (−4.09) −0.101∗∗∗ (−4.79)
lifefut==3 −0.150∗∗∗ (−9.04) −0.251∗∗∗ (−13.87) −0.214∗∗∗ (−11.55)
woman 0.0333∗ (2.43)
married 0.257∗∗∗ (11.87)








15 years 0.0822∗ (2.49)
16 years 0.160∗∗∗ (4.93)
17 years 0.160∗∗∗ (4.95)
18 years 0.276∗∗∗ (10.35)
19 years 0.318∗∗∗ (10.23)
20 years 0.298∗∗∗ (7.97)
21 years 0.433∗∗∗ (10.33)
22+ years 0.522∗∗∗ (19.02)
no full-time education −0.139∗ (−2.03)
cut1
Constant −1.562∗∗∗ (−91.47) −1.996∗∗∗ (−48.91) −2.684∗∗∗ (−34.92)
cut2
Constant −0.738∗∗∗ (−48.95) −1.056∗∗∗ (−26.85) −1.687∗∗∗ (−22.25)
cut3
Constant 0.727∗∗∗ (48.25) 0.658∗∗∗ (16.82) 0.111 (1.48)
Observations 29011 29011 28488
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.108 0.142
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
Variable of interest:
Generally speaking, do you think that the life of those who are children today will be easier,
more difficult or neither easier nor more difficult than the life of those from your own generation?
1 is Easier, 2 Neither easier nor more difficult, and 3 is more difficult
(1) The only regressor is the expectation about the future
(2) and (3) Regressors include only country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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part-time emp. 0.00672 (0.05)
along-side job 0.263 (1.75)
unemployed −0.0481 (−0.52)




net household income (log) 0.322∗∗∗ (4.84)
Observations 1605 1296
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.080
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
Variable of interest:
Given the future, one can hardly take responsibility to bring children into the world.
1 is agree and 0 is disagree
(1) The only regressor is the variable of interest. (2) Regressors also include control variables.
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 21: Dependent variable: life satisfaction. Using distrust in the parliament as an instru-
ment for the expectations about the future.
Reduced form OLS 2SLS
Main activity last 7 days
Trust in country’s parliament −0.00360∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗
(−7.59) (3.73)
gender (gndr recoded) −0.0236∗ −0.0937 −0.231∗
(−2.09) (−1.76) (−2.49)
marsts==Legally married 0.162∗∗∗ −0.420 0.522
(3.54) (−1.78) (1.15)
marsts==In a legally registered civil union 0.183 −0.330 0.895
(1.75) (−1.81) (1.18)
marsts==Legally separated 0.135 −0.688 0.183
(1.69) (−1.53) (0.26)
marsts==Legally divorced/civil union dissolved 0.0673∗∗∗ −0.594∗∗∗ −0.202
(3.32) (−5.56) (−1.04)
marsts==Widowed/civil partner died 0.0957∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗ 0.172
(4.23) (−2.81) (0.69)
employment contract −0.118∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ −0.413
(−8.43) (4.14) (−1.79)
Age of respondent, calculated 0.00836∗∗∗ 0.00476∗ 0.0551∗∗∗
(20.14) (2.41) (3.45)
age squared / 100 −0.000812∗∗∗ −0.000409 −0.00529∗∗∗
(−18.83) (−1.64) (−3.39)
Number of people living regularly as member of household −0.00676 −0.000854 −0.0415
(−1.89) (−0.08) (−1.47)


























Observations 34529 34529 34529
Adjusted R2 0.041 .
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 22: Dependent variable: happiness. Using distrust in the parliament as an instrument for
the expectations about the future.
Reduced form OLS 2SLS
Main activity last 7 days
Trust in country’s parliament −0.00360∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗
(−7.59) (3.45)
gender (gndr recoded) −0.0236∗ −0.211∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗
(−2.09) (−3.09) (−3.48)
marsts==Legally married 0.162∗∗∗ −0.419 0.488
(3.54) (−1.53) (1.04)
marsts==In a legally registered civil union 0.183 −0.0800 1.104
(1.75) (−0.50) (1.44)
marsts==Legally separated 0.135 −0.535 0.309
(1.69) (−1.26) (0.46)
marsts==Legally divorced/civil union dissolved 0.0673∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗∗ −0.138
(3.32) (−3.81) (−0.64)
marsts==Widowed/civil partner died 0.0957∗∗∗ −0.891∗∗∗ −0.365
(4.23) (−5.59) (−1.48)
employment contract −0.118∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗ −0.447
(−8.43) (2.81) (−1.79)
Age of respondent, calculated 0.00836∗∗∗ 0.00969∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗
(20.14) (3.91) (3.53)
age squared / 100 −0.000812∗∗∗ −0.000367 −0.00508∗∗
(−18.83) (−0.90) (−3.09)
Number of people living regularly as member of household −0.00676 0.0135 −0.0261
(−1.89) (1.09) (−0.95)


























Observations 34529 34529 34529
Adjusted R2 0.018 .
t statistics in parentheses
Regressors include country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 23: European Quality of Life - Sept-2008, OLS estimates for life satisfaction.
(1) (2) (3)
futopt==2 −0.608∗∗∗ (−18.90) −0.524∗∗∗ (−16.94) −0.531∗∗∗ (−14.26)
futopt==3 −1.499∗∗∗ (−42.01) −1.246∗∗∗ (−35.43) −1.107∗∗∗ (−25.77)
futopt==4 −2.177∗∗∗ (−52.19) −1.923∗∗∗ (−47.11) −1.766∗∗∗ (−35.46)
futopt==5 −3.226∗∗∗ (−46.45) −2.887∗∗∗ (−42.74) −2.621∗∗∗ (−32.15)
woman 0.0708∗∗ (2.76)
married or living together 0.303∗∗∗ (6.23)
separated or divorced −0.313∗∗∗ (−5.20)
widowed −0.188∗∗ (−2.93)
unemployed −0.779∗∗∗ (−12.28)
home making −0.00172 (−0.04)
retired −0.0378 (−0.72)
one child 0.136∗∗ (3.01)
two children 0.148∗∗ (3.27)
three or more children 0.152∗∗ (2.95)
age −0.0441∗∗∗ (−8.92)
age2/100 0.0482∗∗∗ (9.88)
Household income PPP (log) 0.489∗∗∗ (22.63)
number of people in household 0.0404∗∗ (3.11)
Constant 8.006∗∗∗ (280.94) 8.597∗∗∗ (141.19) 5.709∗∗∗ (26.99)
Observations 35065 35065 22632
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.257 0.333
t statistics in parentheses
Variable of interest:
I am optimistic about the future, graded on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly agree and 5 is strongly disagree
(1) The only regressor is the variable of interest
(2) Regressors include country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity
(3) Regressors include control variables and country dummies, but coefficients of the latter are omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 24: European Quality of Life - Sept-2008, OLS estimates for happiness.
(1) (2) (3)
futopt==2 −0.544∗∗∗ (−19.61) −0.513∗∗∗ (−18.66) −0.472∗∗∗ (−14.27)
futopt==3 −1.230∗∗∗ (−39.33) −1.113∗∗∗ (−35.19) −0.925∗∗∗ (−23.84)
futopt==4 −1.741∗∗∗ (−46.73) −1.628∗∗∗ (−43.53) −1.388∗∗∗ (−30.50)
futopt==5 −2.507∗∗∗ (−38.77) −2.347∗∗∗ (−36.80) −2.035∗∗∗ (−26.41)
woman 0.0705∗∗ (2.98)
married or living together 0.440∗∗∗ (9.69)
separated or divorced −0.344∗∗∗ (−5.97)
widowed −0.368∗∗∗ (−6.07)
unemployed −0.526∗∗∗ (−9.02)
home making −0.0292 (−0.70)
retired −0.0994∗ (−2.03)
one child 0.157∗∗∗ (3.70)
two children 0.194∗∗∗ (4.60)
three or more children 0.204∗∗∗ (4.21)
age −0.0487∗∗∗ (−10.56)
age2/100 0.0446∗∗∗ (9.69)
Household income PPP (log) 0.362∗∗∗ (18.27)
number of people in household 0.0483∗∗∗ (3.93)
Constant 8.260∗∗∗ (340.36) 8.728∗∗∗ (160.86) 6.868∗∗∗ (35.59)
Observations 34963 34963 22605
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.185 0.266
t statistics in parentheses
Variable of interest:
I am optimistic about the future, graded on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly agree and 5 is strongly disagree
(1) The only regressor is the variable of interest
(2) Regressors include country dummies, but coefficients are omitted for brevity
(3) Regressors include control variables and country dummies, but coefficients of the latter are omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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